Who voted for whom? Vote choice in the 2017 Catalan election

By ericguntermann | Published: January 5, 2018

In this blog post, we present some further analyses of the data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work 2017 Catalan election study. Our focus is now on demographics.

 

To determine which characteristics help explain vote choice in the 2017 Catalan election, we ran bivariate multinomial logistic regressions of vote choice on each of the demographic variables (age, first language, education, income, sex, and urban/rural). Age, first language, and education had an impact on vote choice.

 

In our final model, we regressed vote choice on these three demographic variables and we successfully predicted vote choice for 33.5% of respondents. We then simulated vote choice probabilities at each possible value of each of the demographic variables, keeping other variables at their most typical value (mean age, Spanish as first language, non-university education).

 

The first demographic characteristic we consider is age. Age is an important determinant of vote choice for most parties. As we can see in Figure 1, the anti-independence party Citizens (Cs) did best among younger voters. On the other hand, the anti-independence Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC) did best among older Catalans. Like Citizens, the pro-independence Catalan Republican Left (ERC) and the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) did best among younger Catalans. The more conservative pro-independence coalition Together for Catalonia (JxC), led by Carles Puigdemont, did best among older voters. What is clear from these results is that younger Catalans are more supportive of the parties with the most extreme positions with respect to independence (Cs, CUP, and ERC).

 

Figure 1: Age and Vote choice

 

 

The second variable we look at is education. We compare respondents who have finished university to those who have not. The most striking result is that Citizens did much better among Catalans who have not completed university. Together for Catalonia was also more successful among Catalans without a university degree, but the effect is small. All other parties did best among university graduates. In short, a lack of university education strongly distinguishes Citizens’ supporters from supporters of other parties

 

Figure 2: University Education and Vote Choice

 

The most important demographic variable for explaining vote choice is a voter’s first language. We distinguish Catalans whose first language is Catalan from those whose first language is Spanish or who grew up in bilingual homes. The three pro-independence parties, CUP, ERC, and JxC, did much better among Catalan-speaking voters. Conversely, all other parties did better among Catalans who learned Spanish at home. The difference is greatest for Citizens, for which the probability of voting jumps from 0.11 among Catalan speakers to 0.35 among Spanish Speakers. It is also large for ERC and for JxC. The predicted probability of a Catalan speaker voting for ERC is 0.37; for a Spanish speaker, it is 0.19. For ERC, the probabilities are 0.32 and 0.14.

 

For all parties, language is the most important factor accounting for vote choice. Catalan speakers are much more likely to support pro-independence parties. Age is the second most important socio-demographic characteristic. Younger voters are more supportive of the parties with the most extreme positions with respect to independence (Cs, CUP, and ERC).  The impact of education is more limited, except for the lower propensity of university graduates to vote for Cs.

 

Figure 3: First Language and Vote choice

 

Based on these results, we can characterize the typical voter of each party. The typical Citizens voter is young, Spanish-speaking and has not been to university. In contrast, the Socialists did best among older, Spanish-speaking voters. The PP’s electorate was young and Spanish-speaking.

 

The typical CUP or ERC voter is young and Catalan speaking. Together for Catalonia did best among older, Catalan-speaking Catalans. The typical voter for Catalonia in Common-We Can is somewhat older and Spanish-speaking.

 

The socio-demographic profile of party supporters reveals the presence of two strong cleavages. The first and most important is the linguistic cleavage; Catalan speakers are much more likely to vote for pro-independence parties. The second is age; younger voters are much more prone to support the parties that are most extreme on the independence issue, that is, the Cs on the one hand and CUP or ERC on the other hand.

 

 

Eric Guntermann is a postdoctoral researcher in the department of political science at Université de Montréal. He is the research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

 

André Blais is Professor in the department of political science and holds a Research Chair in Electoral Studies at the Université de Montréal. He is the principal investigator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

 

 

 

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

Who voted for whom? Vote choice in the 2017 Catalan election

By ericguntermann | Published: January 5, 2018

In this blog post, we present some further analyses of the data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work 2017 Catalan election study. Our focus is now on demographics.

 

To determine which characteristics help explain vote choice in the 2017 Catalan election, we ran bivariate multinomial logistic regressions of vote choice on each of the demographic variables (age, first language, education, income, sex, and urban/rural). Age, first language, and education had an impact on vote choice.

 

In our final model, we regressed vote choice on these three demographic variables and we successfully predicted vote choice for 33.5% of respondents. We then simulated vote choice probabilities at each possible value of each of the demographic variables, keeping other variables at their most typical value (mean age, Spanish as first language, non-university education).

 

The first demographic characteristic we consider is age. Age is an important determinant of vote choice for most parties. As we can see in Figure 1, the anti-independence party Citizens (Cs) did best among younger voters. On the other hand, the anti-independence Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC) did best among older Catalans. Like Citizens, the pro-independence Catalan Republican Left (ERC) and the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) did best among younger Catalans. The more conservative pro-independence coalition Together for Catalonia (JxC), led by Carles Puigdemont, did best among older voters. What is clear from these results is that younger Catalans are more supportive of the parties with the most extreme positions with respect to independence (Cs, CUP, and ERC).

 

Figure 1: Age and Vote choice

 

 

The second variable we look at is education. We compare respondents who have finished university to those who have not. The most striking result is that Citizens did much better among Catalans who have not completed university. Together for Catalonia was also more successful among Catalans without a university degree, but the effect is small. All other parties did best among university graduates. In short, a lack of university education strongly distinguishes Citizens’ supporters from supporters of other parties

 

Figure 2: University Education and Vote Choice

 

The most important demographic variable for explaining vote choice is a voter’s first language. We distinguish Catalans whose first language is Catalan from those whose first language is Spanish or who grew up in bilingual homes. The three pro-independence parties, CUP, ERC, and JxC, did much better among Catalan-speaking voters. Conversely, all other parties did better among Catalans who learned Spanish at home. The difference is greatest for Citizens, for which the probability of voting jumps from 0.11 among Catalan speakers to 0.35 among Spanish Speakers. It is also large for ERC and for JxC. The predicted probability of a Catalan speaker voting for ERC is 0.37; for a Spanish speaker, it is 0.19. For ERC, the probabilities are 0.32 and 0.14.

 

Figure 3: First Language and Vote choice

For all parties, language is the most important factor accounting for vote choice. Catalan speakers are much more likely to support pro-independence parties. Age is the second most important socio-demographic characteristic. Younger voters are more supportive of the parties with the most extreme positions with respect to independence (Cs, CUP, and ERC).  The impact of education is more limited, except for the lower propensity of university graduates to vote for Cs.

 

 

Based on these results, we can characterize the typical voter of each party. The typical Citizens voter is young, Spanish-speaking and has not been to university. In contrast, the Socialists did best among older, Spanish-speaking voters. The PP’s electorate was young and Spanish-speaking.

The typical CUP or ERC voter is young and Catalan speaking. Together for Catalonia did best among older, Catalan-speaking Catalans. The typical voter for Catalonia in Common-We Can is somewhat older and Spanish-speaking.

The socio-demographic profile of party supporters reveals the presence of two strong cleavages. The first and most important is the linguistic cleavage; Catalan speakers are much more likely to vote for pro-independence parties. The second is age; younger voters are much more prone to support the parties that are most extreme on the independence issue, that is, the Cs on the one hand and CUP or ERC on the other hand.

 

Eric Guntermann is a postdoctoral researcher in the department of political science at Université de Montréal. He is the research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

André Blais is Professor in the department of political science and holds a Research Chair in Electoral Studies at the Université de Montréal. He is the principal investigator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

 

 

 

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

The Structure of Party Ratings in Catalonia

By ericguntermann | Published: December 22, 2017

The Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project conducted an online survey over the seven days preceding the regional election held on December 21 in Catalonia with a sample of 1500 respondents (obtained from Survey Sample International).  Respondents were weighted so that our sample is representative in terms of age, gender, province, the decision to vote, and vote intention.

We asked respondents to rate each party on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that the person strongly dislikes the party and 10 means that she strongly likes the party. In this short note, we present the responses to these questions.

Figure 1 shows the mean rating obtained by each party. Only one party has a mean score above 5, and that is Catalan Republican Left (ERC). Only one party has a score below 3, and that is the People’s Party (PP). The other major pro-independence party, Together for Catalonia (JxC), has a relatively good score, close to 5. What is most remarkable is that the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), which obtained only 4% of the vote, has the same mean score as Citizens (Cs), which managed to obtain 25% of the vote. We also note that the average rating of Catalonia in Common-We Can (Comú) is almost the same as that of the Party of Catalan Socialists (PSC), even though the former received much fewer votes. All in all, the pro-independence parties get much better scores, as those who support independence are prone to evaluate positively all pro-independence parties (see below).

 

Figure 1: Mean Rating of Each Party in the Catalan Election

Table 1 shows the correlations given to pairs of parties. Positive correlations indicate that those who like (dislike) one party tend to also like (dislike) the other party, and negative correlations mean that the more one likes one party the more she tends to dislike the other party. We can see that the correlations between the pro-independence parties are very high (between .67 and .82), much higher than the correlations between the anti-independence parties. In the latter case, ratings of Cs and PP are strongly correlated while those with PSC are much weaker. It is also interesting to look at the ratings of Catalunya in Comú, the party that is not clearly pro or anti-independence. Its ratings are moderately positively correlated with those given to the three pro-independence parties and negatively correlated with those of Cs and PP. There is no correlation between the ratings of Comú and the PSC.

Table 1: Correlations between Evaluations of Each Party

Cs PP PSC Comú JxC ERC CUP
Cs 1.00 0.72 0.49 -0.40 -0.58 -0.67 -0.54
PP 0.72 1.00 0.32 -0.28 -0.42 -0.48 -0.36
PSC 0.49 0.32 1.00 0.05 -0.37 -0.41 -0.40
Come -0.40 -0.28 0.05 1.00 0.31 0.38 0.36
JxC -0.58 -0.42 -0.37 0.31 1.00 0.82 0.67
ERC -0.67 -0.48 -0.41 0.38 0.82 1.00 0.74
CUP -0.54 -0.36 -0.40 0.36 0.67 0.74 1.00

Finally, Table 2 presents the mean score given to the other parties by the supporters of each party (that is, those who prefer a given party). We see again that supporters of each pro-independence party are positive (the means are clearly above 5) towards the other pro-independence parties, which is not the case on the anti-independence side. Most importantly, supporters of the PSC give extremely low scores to the PP, while supporters of the PP are also quite negative towards PSC. It is also worth noting that Cs supporters give slightly higher marks to the PSC than to the PP. As for Comú supporters, they give very negative ratings to Cs and the PP while being more neutral with respect to the other parties. Comú manages to get an overall mean of 5 on the 0 to 10 scale among supporters of ERC.

 

Table 2: Evaluations of each Party by Preferred Party

Evaluation of
  Cs PP PSC Comú JxC ERC CUP
Cs 8.48 3.69 4.78 1.37 1.08 1.37 0.93
PP 6.63 8.81 3.33 1.43 1.14 1.78 1.03
PSC 4.47 1.63 7.90 4.12 2.41 3.10 1.49
Comú 0.86 0.27 2.87 8.34 3.58 4.67 2.44
JxC 0.56 0.51 1.58 2.72 9.27 8.02 5.42
ERC 0.85 0.29 2.04 4.97 7.14 8.86 5.92
CUP 0.21 0.06 1.23 3.97 6.18 7.45 8.83
Overall 3.46 1.73 3.57 3.48 4.62 5.13 3.45

The main finding is that pro-independence party supporters are much more cohesive than their anti-independence counterparts. The former feel positive towards each of the other pro-independence parties, which is clearly not the case of anti-independence supporters. Finally, these data confirm the strong repudiation of the PP among the electorate. Not only did the party get only 4% of the vote, but even those opposed to independence are not willing to give the party a positive evaluation.

André Blais is Professor in the department of political science and holds a Research Chair in Electoral Studies at the Université de Montréal. He is the principal investigator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

Eric Guntermann is a postdoctoral researcher in the department of political science at Université de Montréal. He is the research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

The Recent Election in Catalonia: A Vote on Independence

By ericguntermann | Published: December 22, 2017

On December 21st, Catalans voted in an election to their regional Parliament. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called the election hoping to lower the tension caused by the crisis over independence. However, as in the previous regional election held in 2015, pro-independence parties collectively won a majority of seats. At the same time, the party that most strongly opposes independence, Citizens, won a plurality of votes and seats.

Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) conducted an online survey over the seven days preceding the election with a sample of 1500 respondents obtained from Survey Sampling International.  Respondents were weighted so that our sample is representative in terms of age, gender, education, province, the decision to vote, and vote choice.

We found that voters overwhelmingly voted for a party on their side of the independence issue. We asked respondents how strongly they support or oppose independence on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating stronger support. We consider those who gave a score under 4 independence opponents (35.9% of the sample), those who gave a score over 6 independence supporters (47.6% of the Sample), and those who answered from 4 to 6 ambivalent (16.4% of the sample).

Figure 1 shows how respondents in each group voted. As we can see nearly all independence supporters voted for one of the pro-independence parties, Together for Catalonia (JxC), Catalan Republican Left (ERC), and the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP). Most of those who oppose independence voted for one of the parties opposing independence, Citizens (Cs), the People’s Party (PP), and the Party of Catalan Socialists (PSC). The more ambivalent Catalonia in Common-We Can (Comú) did best among Catalans who neither clearly support nor oppose independence.

 

 Figure 1: Vote Choice by Position on Independence

 

Based on the independence scale, supporters of independence, although a minority, appear to outnumber those opposing it. We also asked about independence two other ways.

First, we ran a question-wording experiment in which half the sample was asked whether they want Catalonia to become an independent state. The other half was asked whether they want Catalonia to separate from Spain. As Figure 2 shows, when asked whether Catalonia should become an independent state, the same percentage of Catalans says yes as no (45%). When asked whether Catalonia should separate from Spain, however, opponents outnumber supporters of separation (47% compared to 41%).

 

Figure 2: Support for an Independent State Compared to Separation from Spain

We also asked Catalans what their preferred relationship is between Catalonia and Spain using a question-wording experiment. One random half of the sample was asked whether Catalonia should be “an autonomous community with less autonomy than it currently has,” “an autonomous community with the same autonomy it currently has,” “an autonomous community with more autonomy,” or “an Independent state.” The second half of the sample was presented with the same set of categories except the option “autonomous community with more autonomy” was replaced with “state in a federal Spain.” This option – a “state in a federal Spain” –  is the solution to the nationalist conflict Catalan and Spanish Socialists have been proposing for years.

Figure 3 presents support for these options in each of the groups. Once again, we find different levels of support depending on the question asked. In the “more autonomy” version, 39% support independence. In the federalization option, 30% do. Question wording clearly makes a difference.

 

 

Figure 3: referred Relationship Between Spain and Catalan, by Question Wording

Finally, we asked people to evaluate four major decisions made by the Catalan and Spanish governments over the past three months: the Catalan government’s decision to organize an illegal referendum, the Spanish government’s decision to send the police to stop the referendum, the Catalan government’s decision to declare independence, and the Spanish government’s subsequent decision to suspend autonomy. As the table below shows, Catalans clearly opposed decisions made by both governments, except the Catalan government’s decision to hold an illegal referendum, which received slightly more support than opposition.

 

Table 1: Percentage who Support Government Actions

  Support Oppose Ambivalent
Hold illegal referendum 44.0 42.1 13.8
Send police to stop the referendum 19.4 70.4 10.1
Declare independence 35.5 49.1 15.3
Suspend Catalan autonomy 27.2 54.8 18.0

 

In short, on December 21st, Catalans voted overwhelmingly based on their attitudes towards independence. However, voters’ preferences for Catalonia’s future vary depending on the question wording. Finally, Catalans support neither the actions of the Catalan government nor those of the Spanish government in the recent crisis over independence.  

 

Eric Guntermann is a postdoctoral researcher in the department of political science at Université de Montréal. He is the research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.

 

 

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

Catalan Election Survey

By ericguntermann | Published: December 13, 2017
In the context of the historic election that will be held on December 21st in Catalonia, Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) has decided to run a pre-electoral survey. The survey is being run by Eric Guntermann, André Blais (Université de Montréal), Ignacio Lago (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), and Marc Guinjoan (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona). It will interview 1500 respondents online in the week preceding the election.

The survey will consist notably of questions on vote choice, on attitudes related to Catalan independence, and on evaluations of the actions taken by both the Catalan and Spanish governments.

The objective of the survey is to explain vote choice and attitudes related to independence. Consequently, MEDW researchers will not release any results prior to the close of polls on December 21st. Shortly after the election, a short report with the main findings will be posted on the project’s blog and sent to the media.

Questions about the survey should be addressed to the MEDW research coordinator at [email protected]
Posted in Blog | Comments closed

Party influence where predispositions are strong and party identification is weak: Assessing citizens’ reactions to party cues on regional nationalism in Spain

By ericguntermann | Published: November 29, 2017

By Eric Guntermann, Postdoctoral researcher at the Research Chair in Electoral Studies and research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work

 

Do parties influence opinions on nationalism in Spain?

Numerous studies have shown that parties influence opinions, especially in the US (e.g. Cohen, 2003; Druckman et al., 2013; Kam, 2005). It is unclear, however, whether such influence occurs in other contexts where party identification is less common and where multi-party systems are the norm. Moreover, it is not clear what kinds of issue opinions parties can influence. The existing literature suggests that opinions that are rooted in predispositions are resistant to party influence (Tesler, 2015).

In this recent publication, I show that parties influence opinions on regional nationalism in Spain, even though most people lack a party identification there and even though nationalism is rooted in identity. I argue that, when confronted by conflict between a party they like and a party they dislike, citizens adopt the position of the side they prefer regardless of whether they identify with it. Moreover, parties can influence opinions on nationalism, because many people in nationalist contexts have ambivalent identities, both with the region and with the country.

Study 1: Laboratory experiment in Catalonia

In May 2016, I recruited 113 participants for a lab experiment in Barcelona. I presented each participant two positions their preferred party has that they do not share as well as the contrasting positions of a party they dislike. While participants in the control group simply read statements that were attributed to “some politicians”, those in the treatment group were clearly associated with the relevant parties. As the figure shows, I found that those in the treatment group became more than one point (on a scale from 0 to 10) more supportive of their party’s position than those in the control group. However, they did not change their ratings of either their preferred or disliked parties.

 

Figure: Changes in issue opinions and in evaluations of preferred and disliked parties

 

Study 2: Survey experiment in Galicia

A few weeks later, I recruited a representative sample of 600 respondents in Galicia. I showed them party positions on two issues: whether Galicia is a nation and whether Galicia has a right to self-determination. The order of these issues was randomized across respondents. On the first issue, participants read their preferred party’s position. On the second issue respondents read about, they saw that position along with the contrasting position of a party they dislike. As in Study 1, respondents in the control group read positions that were attributed to anonymous politicians, while those in the treatment group read statements that were clearly associated with parties.

 

I found that the treatment-group respondents reported opinions that were closer to their preferred party’s position on the second issue on which they read contrasting cues. Cues from a preferred party alone only influenced opinions among participants who identified with that party. Influence was strongest on the issue of whether Galicia is a nation and among participants who identify with both Galicia and Spain.

 

In short, party influence extends to opinions on an issue that is rooted in identities despite the weakness of party identification.

 

For more details, see Eric Guntermann. Party influence where predispositions are strong and party identification is weak: Assessing citizens’ reactions to party cues on regional nationalism in Spain. Party Politics. DOI: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354068817736756

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

When David and Goliath campaign online: the effects of digital media use during electoral campaigns on vote for small parties

By ericguntermann | Published: November 13, 2017

What is the story?

A growing literature examines the effects of digital media on the fortunes of challenger parties. Challengers might have an advantage online given that digital technologies are making small contenders more visible compared to big ones. Moreover, the plurality of new media will cater to niche audiences, undermining the appeal of mainstream parties.  Most of this literature, however, focuses on party strategies (and is mostly American) and not on vote choice.

In this paper, we ask whether digital media contribute to electoral fragmentation by moving citizens’ vote from mainstream to third parties. We address the causal mechanisms connecting digital media and vote for challenger parties, namely the perceived electoral chances of small parties and, voters’ indecision caused by exposure to online political information. Also, we test the fragmentation potential of the Internet on vote choice using a cross-country study (Making Electoral Democracy Work, 21 elections held in 4 countries). Finally, we measure fragmentation at the individual level, comparing vote intention in pre-electoral surveys with vote reported in post-electoral surveys.

Figure 1: Causal schema. Direct and direct effects of digital media use during electoral campaigns on voting for “big” and “small” parties

Figure 2. Distribution of the dependent variable, by country

 

Results and Conclusions

Only 5% of voters change their initial vote intention from a large party to a small one. While traditional media use during the campaign has a concentration effect, benefitting large parties; online media has a positive effect on both the likelihood of sticking with small parties and, especially, the likelihood of switching to small parties.

We also contend that indecision about one’s vote choice and the perceived chances of small parties will increase with digital media use. This, in turn, positively affects the chances of voting for a small party. We tested a multiple mediation model by means of structural equations. We found that, the more an individual uses the Internet during an electoral campaign, the more uncertain they become about their vote choice, which, ultimately, increases their likelihood of voting for a small party. Nevertheless, the mediating role of the perceived chances of extra parliamentary parties is only marginal, and it works better for the chances to switch in favor of a large party.

Carol Galais and Ana Sofía Cardenal, A. S. (2017). When David and Goliath campaign online: the effects of digital media use during electoral campaigns on vote for small parties. Journal of Information Technology & Politics

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

What Do Political Scientists Know About Electoral Reform that Practitioners Do Not? A View from Europe and Canada

By ericguntermann | Published: November 1, 2017

Camille Bedock (University of Brussels), Damien Bol (King’s College London), Thomas Ehrhard (University of Paris II)

 

What is the story?

When politicians or public officials consider changing the electoral system, they often seek advice from political scientists. The APSA Task Force on Political Science, Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance conducted a survey on the topic. In their follow-up report, the authors note that more than 50 US-based political scientists have been involved in electoral reform processes since 2000.

In a symposium recently published in the Election Law Journal, we offer new insights on this topic by offering a view from outside of the US. We invited five political scientists from Europe and Canada who have been involved in electoral reform in their country, and who engaged with politicians, public officials, and the national media on the topic, to answer two related questions: (1) what do political scientists know about electoral reform that practitioners do not?; (2) do they make a difference?

 

Content

There are 5 contributions to the symposium:

Bedock, Camille, Damien Bol, and Thomas Ehrhard (2017) Political Scientists and Electoral Reforms in Europe and Canada: What They Know, What They Do. Election Law Journal 16(3): 335–340.

In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the literature on the role of political scientists in electoral reform and summarize the main conclusions of the contributions to the symposium. We identify the differences and similarities between countries, and give new comparative insights to the debate regarding the involvement of political scientists in electoral reform.

 

Renwick, Alan (2017). Electoral Reform: What Do Political Scientists Know That Practitioners Do Not? Lessons from the UK Referendum of 2011. Election Law Journal 16(3): 341-348.

Alan Renwick reports on his experience as one of the main government and media experts in the (unsuccessful) 2011 electoral reform referendum in the United Kingdom. He explains why the common wisdom that practitioners know less about electoral systems than political scientists is largely unfounded. Practitioners have a clear idea about the consequences of electoral laws. Therefore, political scientists should focus on educating the public rather than politicians, and accept to learn from practitioners, as they sometimes know more about electoral systems than they do.

 

Milner, Henry (2017). Electoral System Reform, the Canadian Experience. Election Law Journal. 16(3): 349-356.

Henry Milner builds upon years of involvement in various electoral reform processes in Canada. He notes that despite the clear preference built over the years by some political scientists in Canada for moving to a mixed-member proportional system, they have not been able to change the system. According to him, political scientists should engage in the strategic dimension of electoral reform, for example, by anticipating the arguments of proponents of the status quo.

 

Freire, André (2017). Electoral Reform in Portugal: The Role of Political Scientists. Election Law Journal 16(3): 357-366.

André Freire answers the questions of the symposium based on his involvement as the main government expert in an important electoral reform in Portugal in 2009. He argues that the major difference between political scientists and practitioners is not so much their knowledge but the specific partisan interests of the latter. Also, he notes that the involvement of political scientists in electoral reform processes makes them more open and transparent.

 

Riera Pedro, and José Roman Montero (2017) Attempts to Reform the Electoral System in Spain: The Role of Experts. Election Law Journal 16(3): 367-376.

Pedro Riera and José Ramón Montero report on their involvement in the (failed) electoral reform processes that took place in Spain in 2008 and 2015. They admit, quite honestly, that despite their formal involvement in the process their influence was almost nil. They argue that, in situations where there is a divergence of interests among parties, there is little that political scientists can do to affect the outcome of electoral reform.

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

Does Democratic Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout? Global Evidence Since 1939

By ericguntermann | Published: September 27, 2017

 

By Filip Kostelka, Institutions and Political Economy Research Group (IPERG), University of Barcelona & Centre d’études européennes, Sciences Po, Paris

 

Voting rates in new democracies often decline dramatically. For instance, in less than twenty years after democratization, voter turnout fell by 17.5 percentage points (pp) in Portugal (which has held democratic elections since 1975), 29 pp in El Salvador (1982), 30 pp South Korea (1988), and 47 pp in Romania (1990). Both researchers and journalists usually ascribe these declines to citizens’ disillusionment with the functioning of the new democratic regime and raising apathy in the face of reduced electoral stakes. Democratic consolidation, the process through which democracy becomes established, is believed to depress turnout.

However, this conventional interpretation is problematic. First, it does not explain the striking variation that exists among new democracies. My review of 91 democratic consolidations that took place between 1939 and 2015 shows that, in half of new democracies, turnout declined little or not at all (see Figure 1). For instance, in Spain, which, like neighbouring Portugal, experienced a military dictatorship that lasted several decades before democratizing in the mid-1970s, turnout decreased by only 2.6 pp. This is 7 times less than in Portugal. Second, a number of recent studies, including those employing a pre-/post-election panel design, have found no causal relationship between democratic dissatisfaction and voter turnout.

Figure 1: Voter Turnout Change in the First Six Democratic Elections

In a new study, I offer an alternative explanation of the deep participation declines that sometimes occur in new democracies. I argue that these declines originate in exceptionally high levels of participation at the beginning of the democratic transition, which are provoked by the democratization context. If regime change is a revolution or if citizens are used to voting from the authoritarian era, the democratization context is strongly mobilizing and conducive to electoral participation. In such cases, the voting rate in the founding democratic elections exceeds the “standard” level that would be expected in an established democracy with the same characteristics as the new democracy at hand. Later on, however, as the democratization context loses salience, voter turnout returns to the “standard” level, which is determined by the same factors as in established democracies. Only on face value, it seems that participation is depressed by the democratic consolidation context but, in reality, the dynamic is driven by what happened before the process of consolidation has even started.

To test both the conventional and my alternative accounts, I compiled an original dataset that covers most legislative elections held in new and established democracies between 1939 and 2015. I run two regression analyses. In the first, I test whether, in the first democratic elections, voter turnout reaches higher levels that those that would be expected in established democracies. I find that it is the case and that, as hypothesized, participation is particularly high after bottom-up democratizations, and when the preceding authoritarian regime held elections and forced its citizens to vote in them.

In the second analysis, I model voter turnout dynamics in new democracies. The results reveal that the initial participation surplus, which I call as the democratization bonus, translates into declines. This makes sense of the stark contrast between Portugal and Spain. In Portugal, the democratization process was mainly driven by the democratic opposition, which rendered the Portuguese founding election particularly mobilizing. In Spain, the democratization mover was the authoritarian regime, which limited the euphoria and stakes in the Spanish founding election.

Once this democratization bonus is controlled for, democratic consolidation seems to depress voter turnout only in post-communist democracies. Additionally, like in established democracies, voting rates in new democracies have tended to decrease since the 1970s regardless of the democratization and democratic consolidation contexts.

Altogether, the results untangle the complexity of voter turnout dynamics in new democracies. They show that a single occurrence of a voter turnout decline in new democracies may stem from one to three sources. In combination, the three sources can contribute to particularly sharp drops in electoral participation, such as that observed in Romania. They also explain why we have seen so many dramatic declines since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in 1974: prior to the third wave, opposition-driven democratizations from electorally mobilized dictatorships were rare, no consolidating democracy had to cope with Communist legacies, and the global environment was pushing turnout up in all democracies.

For more details, read Kostelka, Filip. 2017. “Does Democratic Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout? Global Evidence Since 1939.” American Political Science Review. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000259.

Posted in Blog | Comments closed

What’s Happening in Catalonia? The Crackdown May Increase Support for an Unpopular Plan

By ericguntermann | Published: September 22, 2017

By Eric Guntermann, Université de Montréal

People all over the world this week read about Spanish police arresting Catalan government officials and confiscating ballots for an independence referendum. Rather than harming the Catalan government, however, I argue that the crackdown may help it raise support for its unpopular roadmap towards independence.

In the last regional election, held in 2015, secessionist parties argued that a majority of votes would give them a mandate to make Catalonia an independent state. However, they did less well than expected and needed the radical secessionist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) to govern. Together they received a majority of seats (53.3%) but not of votes (47.9%).

Nevertheless, they saw the result as a mandate to move unilaterally towards independence. They eventually announced a referendum on independence for October 1, 2017, even though the Spanish government insisted doing so was unconstitutional.

However, the Catalan population has been reluctant to support the regional government’s plan. In a survey Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) ran prior to the Spanish national election held in 2016, only 43.3 % of respondents supported the government’s unilateral independence plan. In fact, more Catalans strongly opposed it (28.0%) than strongly supported it (24.2%). Catalan government surveys also showed that support for independence fell below 40% in 2015.

 

Parties and Ambivalent Citizens

In a paper that was recently accepted for publication at Party politics, I show that conflict between opposing party positions leads people who prefer one side to the other to adopt that party’s positions as their own. Thus, conflict between regional nationalist parties and the national government led by the People’s Party (PP), which is extremely unpopular in Catalonia, should increase support for the nationalists’ plan.  

In Catalonia, many citizens are ambivalent. In separate questions, the MEDW survey asked Catalans how attached they are to Catalonia and Spain on a scale from 0 to 10. I created a score representing how much more (or less) a respondent identifies with Catalonia than with Spain by subtracting identification with Spain from identification with Catalonia.

I plot the proportions with each value in Figure 1. We can see that overall Catalans identify more with Catalonia than with Spain. The mean value is 1.3. However, many Catalans have ambivalent identities and may be influenced by the PP’s opposition to the Catalan government’s actions.

Figure 1: Relative Identification with Catalonia and Spain

 

Survey Experiment: Does Opposition from the PP Increase Support for the Catalan Government’s Plans?

An experiment was added to the MEDW survey to see how Catalans respond to PP opposition to the Catalan government’s actions. Half of the 543 respondents were randomly assigned to a control group that read a statement that the “Catalan Government has decided to take steps towards the independence of Catalonia without an agreement with the Spanish Government”. The other half were assigned to a treatment group that read the same statement followed by “the Partido Popular (PP) opposes this decision”.

Respondents in both groups were asked whether they support or oppose the Catalan government’s actions. I focus on the half of Catalans with the most ambivalent identities, who, as argued above, are the most susceptible to being influenced by the PP’s opposition.

Figure 2 shows the responses among these participants. In the control group, 60.0% oppose the plan, while 27.09% support it. In the treatment group, opposition drops to 53.8% and support rises to 33.8%.

Figure 2: Effect of PP Opposition on Support for Unilateral Steps Towards Independence (Ambivalent Identifiers)

To test for significance, I created a numeric version of the support variable (coded from 1 to 4, where higher numbers indicate greater support for unilateral independence). The difference between the two groups is 0.32 (p<0.05). Thus, ambivalent respondents who read about the PP’s opposition to unilateral independence were significantly more supportive of the Catalan government’s plan than those who did not read about that opposition.

Given that a simple statement that the PP opposes the secessionists’ plan influences support for it, it is likely that the powerful assertion of the PP’s opposition we saw this week will have a much stronger effect.

 

For the article referenced above, see Guntermann, Eric (2017). “Party influence where predispositions are strong and party identification is weak: Assessing citizens’ reactions to party cues on regional nationalism in Spain” Party Politics, http://ericguntermann.com/docs/partycues.pdf

Posted in Blog | Comments closed